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APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF WORK FOR HIRE AND JOINT
WORKS TO WEBSITE DEVELOPMENT
Han Sheng Beh*
This Comment explores how copyrights, specifically the work-
for-hire doctrine and joint works, have been modified to fit Internet
webpages and websites. Beginning with an overview of the basic
technology of webpages, this Comment then outlines the seminal
work-for-hire and joint works cases. It then evaluates current cases
dealing with copyright in this new form of media, using State v.
Kirby, a New Mexico Supreme Court case decided in the summer of
2007, as a focal point. Finally, this Comment attempts to outline
methods that individuals or attorneys can use to protect themselves
when dealing with the work-for-hire doctrine and whether a webpage
or website should be considered a joint work.
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APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF WORK FOR HIRE AND JOINT
WORKS TO WEBSITE DEVELOPMENT
INTRODUCTION
Terminology such as "webpage," "domain name," and "the
Internet" used to be part of a language reserved for only those that
were computer savvy. Eight years into the twenty-first century, the
technology these words describe has permeated our everyday lives.
As the Internet expands, copyright protection for the content and de-
signs placed on the "information superhighway" become increasingly
necessary.
Under § 201(a) of the Copyright Act, an author of a piece of
work is also the initial copyright owner.1 However, the statute also
authorizes the shifting of the initial vesting of copyright ownership to
an employer or commissioner of the work upon creation.2 This ex-
ception to § 201 (a) is known as the work for hire doctrine.
The work for hire doctrine is a flexible standard that has been
thoroughly litigated in a myriad of different fields.4 Nevertheless,
because the Internet is arguably an infant in comparison to the other
forms of information media, parameters of the work for hire doctrine
in this area are barely defined.
This Comment will explore the copyright issues that the web
17 U.S.C.A. § 201(a) (West 2005).
2 17 U.S.C.A. § 201(a); 17 U.S.C.A § 201(b) (West 2005).
3 17 U.S.C.A. § 201(b).
4 See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989); Aymes v.
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development industry is facing. Specifically, the history and current
flux of the work for hire and joint works doctrines will be discussed.
This Comment will show how websites can fit under the work for
hire doctrine due to the doctrine's flexible nature and why it should
also be able to satisfy the joint work doctrine. Furthermore, this
Comment posits that a distinction between websites and webpages is
needed, since simplifying these two separate entities into one could
give rise to unreasonable results in copyright ownership. Before
tackling the legal issues, Part I will give background information on
the technological aspect of websites. Part II will introduce the federal
statutory basis for work for hire, while Part III will examine the his-
tory and case decisions establishing the work for hire standard. Parts
IV and V will discuss the problems involved with copyrighting web-
sites and whether websites can fit under the work for hire doctrine.
Part Vi will give advice on how to deal with the current view of work
for hire, and Part VII analyzes if, and under what circumstances a
website can be a joint work.
I. A BRIEF EXPLANATION ON THE TECHNOLOGY OF WEBSITES
Generally, a website is comprised of three main components:
a webaddress, webpages and a computer, more specifically, a service
provider or host.5 A webaddress, also known as a domain name, al-
lows others who are "online" to locate a website by typing the ad-
dress into a browser. Webaddresses can come in the form of the di-
rect address of a computer or a registered domain name, an alias that
5 S. IGNACIMUTHU, S.i., BASIC BIO1NFORMATICS 17 (2004).
2009]
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points to a computer's address. A domain name has significant ad-
vantages as it provides a memorable, user friendly way of locating a
website.6
A webpage is computer code used to display content on a
website that requires interpretation by a browser. When a browser is
directed to an address, the initial webpage, also known as the home-
page, is displayed on the user's browser. From the homepage, a user
can click on "links," or manipulate the webaddress, to visit other
webpages related to the website. Sometimes links can refer a user to
another website, which has its own group of webpages.7
Finally, a service provider, also known as a host, is where the
webpages are stored. A host stores the webpage code and delivers
the code to users who request it. By pointing their browsers to an ad-
dress, users retrieve the code from the host to view it on their own
computers. A website can be hosted from any computer, including a
personal computer. However, most websites employ a service pro-
vider to supply better speed and stability.8
The word "website" used in the everyday context broadly de-
scribes the interaction of all three components. When one states that
a website is "down" or "offline," one can be referring to a multitude
of technical problems that can be associated with a website. For ex-
ample, the homepage could have been changed to reflect maintenance
is taking place, so the users visiting the site cannot access the infor-
mation they seek; the service provider could be experiencing some
6 COMM. ON INTERNET NAVIGATION AND THE DOMAIN NAME Sys.: TECHNICAL
ALTERNATIVES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS, SIGNPOSTS IN CYBERSPACE 1-2 (2005).
7 IGNACIMUTHU, supra note 5, at 17.
8 Id. at 18.
948 [Vol. 25
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technical difficulty either with its hardware (where the webpage code
is stored) or network (the transmission of code to users asking for it);
or, the domain name has expired and no longer points to the web-
pages that a user wants to access.9
II. THE STATUTORY BASIS: THE FEDERAL COPYRIGHT ACT
Important to the discussion at hand is the Copyright Act of
1976, the federal statutes that govern, among other things, copyright
ownership and the work for hire doctrine.'1 Section 201(a) states that
the author of a work is the initial copyright holder, while § 201(b) of
the Copyright Act outlines the work for hire exception. 1 Section
201(b) states:
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or
other person for whom the work was prepared is con-
sidered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless
the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a writ-
ten instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights
comprised in the copyright.
1 2
Read textually, this section shifts the authorship to either the
employer or the person who commissioned the work. This shift gives
copyright ownership to the employer or commissioner instead of the
creator of the work. Section 101 complements § 201 by providing
the definition of a work made for hire. Section 101 states, in perti-
9 See, e.g., SearchNetworking.com, What Is Offline-Definition,
http://searchnetworking.techtarget.com/sDefinition/O,,sid7_gci542056,00.html (last visited
Mar. 23, 2009).
1o Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-1332 (West 2005).
" Id. § 201(a), (b).
12 Id. § 201(b).
20091 949
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nent part, that a "work for hire" is:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope
of his or her employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use
as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a
motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a transla-
tion, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an
instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a
test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a
written instrument signed by them that the work shall
be considered a work made for hire.
13
The plain text of the definition shows two ways to fall under
the work for hire doctrine. One is through the employer-employee
relationship in which the employee creates or performs some work
within the scope of employment. The other is where there is no em-
ployment relationship but the work was 1) specially commissioned
for; 2) one of the nine statutorily enumerated works; and 3) expressly
agreed to be a work for hire in a signed written instrument. Read to-
gether, the two sections should give a good explanation of the work
for hire doctrine. However, despite its seeming clarity, the doctrine
has been thoroughly litigated with issues such as the employer-
employee relationship, and the scope of employment becoming major
points of contention in work for hire cases.
III. THE WORK FOR HIRE STANDARD
Copyright ownership under work for hire has been applied to




Touro Law Review, Vol. 25 [2009], No. 3, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol25/iss3/5
WORK FOR HIRE
the cases preceding it to mold the work for hire doctrine within a par-
ticular technology or circumstance. Work for hire has been applied
to arts, academia, and even computer programming. 4 This Part will
discuss work for hire's rich background and gradual evolution to the
current issue of copyright within website development.
A. Sculpting the Face of Work For Hire: CCNV v.
Reid
The seminal case dealing with work made for hire is Commu-
nity for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid. Reid resolved the copyright
ownership of a sculpture between an artist and the organization that
hired him.' 5 The Community for Creative Non-Violence ("CCNV")
contacted James Reid to create a sculpture depicting the "plight of the
homeless" for a pageant.' 6 Mr. Reid agreed to do so, and the parties
established the sculpture "would cost no more than $15,000" exclud-
ing Mr. Reid's workmanship, which he donated.' 7 The copyright
ownership dispute arose between the parties after the creation of the
sculpture when both parties wanted control over the sculpture's tour-
ing schedule.'
8
Examining § 101(2) of the Copyright Act, the Supreme Court
of the United States held that a sculpture did not fall under one of the
nine enumerated works, 9 and there was no express written agreement
14 See, e.g., Reid, 490 U.S. at 730; Aymes, 980 F.2d at 857; Weinstein, 811 F.2d at 1091.
15 Reid, 490 U.S. at 732.
16 Id. at 733.
I? Id. at 734.
'8 Id. at 735.
19 See supra Part II.
2009]
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the work was to be made for hire.2° As a result, the Court easily dis-
missed the applicability of § 101 (2). Instead, it focused its reasoning
on whether there was an employer-employee relationship that would
trigger work for hire under § 101(1).21 Interpreting Congress' intent,
the Court outlined a twelve factor test, grounded in the common law
of agency, to determine if Mr. Reid was an employee of CCNV.22
The Court found that sculpting was a skilled profession, that Mr.
Reid used his own tools, controlled his own work time, received
payment the way independent contractors were paid, was retained for
less than two months, and that CCNV did not pay social security
taxes or offer employee benefits to Mr. Reid. These factors
weighed heavily in favor of Mr. Reid's status as an independent con-
tractor and not an employee.24
To reach its decision, the Supreme Court dismissed three
other tests used by the circuit courts to determine if an employer-
employee relationship exists.25 The Court found that CCNV moni-
tored parts of the creation of the sculpture. For example, CCNV took
20 Reid, 490 U.S. at 738.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 740. The relevant factors are:
[T]he skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the lo-
cation of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties;
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the
hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how
long to work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and
paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the
hiring party; whether the hiring party is a business; the provision of em-
ployee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party.
Id. at 751-52.
23 Id. at 752-53.
24 Id. at 752.
25 Reid, 490 U.S. at 742, 743 n.8 (rejecting the "right to control test," "actual control test"
and that an employee only refers to a salaried or formal employee).
952 [Vol. 25
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Mr. Reid around Washington to observe homeless people, suggested
he visit a homeless shelter to view suitable models, and insisted that
the homeless people depicted in the sculpture use a shopping cart to
hold their belongings instead of shopping bags. 26 However, it re-
jected the argument that CCNV's monitoring actions determined Mr.
Reid's status as an employee.27 Consequently, the Court held that
Mr. Reid was an independent contractor. 28 The Supreme Court did
not determine whether the sculpture was a joint work as this issue
was reserved on remand.29
Evident within the Reid opinion was the Court's motivation to
maintain predictability of copyright ownership by establishing what it
believed to be a test that could be applied uniformly. 30 However, due
to the extensive list of factors outlined within Reid, criticism has
arisen regarding the probability of unequal application of such a sub-
jective, complex test.31 Nevertheless, Reid established strong prece-
dent that would be applied to subsequent cases involving different
works and circumstances.
B. Scope of Employment Clarified in Academia Cases
In the academia arena of schools and universities, the focal
point of the work for hire doctrine is different. Whereas the Reid de-
cision concentrated on whether the creator of a work was an em-
26 Id. at 734.
27 See id. at 734, 741.
21 Id. at 753.
29 Id.
30 See Reid, 490 U.S. at 740.
31 Charles D. Ossola, Recent Developments Relating to Copyright Ownership and Trans-
fer, 441 PLI/Pat 7, 12-13 (1996).
2009] 953
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ployee or an independent contractor, the debate in the school setting
focuses on whether employees are working within their scope of em-
ployment.32 Because a teaching position is usually a salaried position
and is heavily controlled by the educational institution, teachers are
usually unable to deny that they are not employees of a school or
university. Nevertheless, Reid clearly affected these cases by estab-
lishing that the common law of agency was to be used to determine
whether an employee was working within the scope of employment.
Disputes between professors and educational institutions de-
cided prior to Reid articulated what came to be known as the "teacher
exception" to the work for hire doctrine.33 For example, in Weinstein
v. University of Illinois, the Seventh Circuit held that a professor's
scholarly article was not a work for hire because publishing articles
was not a required duty. 34 Similarly, in Hays v. Sony Corp. of Amer-
ica,35 the Seventh Circuit stated that high school teachers who created
a word processor manual for class would probably hold the copyright
due to the teacher exception. 6
However, the viability of the teacher exception came into
question after Reid because the opinion made no mention of the ex-
ception.37 In addition, cases in the academic setting like Shaul v.
Cherry Valley-Springfield Central School District38 applied the Reid
32 Compare Reid, 490 U.S. 730, with Weinstein, 811 F.2d 1091.
33 Jeff Todd, Student Rights in Online Course Materials: Rethinking the Fac-
ulty/University Dynamic, 17 ALB. L.J. SCa. & TECH. 311, 322-23 (2007).
34 Weinstein, 811 F.2d at 1094.
3' 847 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1988), abrogated by Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S.
384 (1990) (abrogating for other reasons).
36 Id. at416.
37 See generally Reid, 490 U.S. 730.
38 363 F.3d 177 (2d Cir. 2004).
954 [Vol. 25
12
Touro Law Review, Vol. 25 [2009], No. 3, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol25/iss3/5
WORK FOR HIRE
standard while limiting the teacher exception.
In Cherry Valley, the Second Circuit held that a high school
teacher's tests, quizzes, and homework assignments fell under the
work for hire doctrine, and therefore the school was the author and
owner of the teaching materials. 39 In determining whether an em-
ployee's conduct falls within the scope of employment, the court
used a three part test: "(1) [i]t is of the kind of work [an employee] is
employed to perform; (2) [i]t occurs substantially within authorized
work hours; [and] (3) [i]t is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to
serve the employer., 40  Because preparing testing materials was a
regular duty of a school teacher, preparation outside of class was
commonplace in the profession. Thus, the tests were created to fulfill
the goals of the school. Therefore, the court held that Mr. Shaul was
an employee working within his scope of employment when he cre-
ated the tests and quizzes. 4' Furthermore, the court distinguished the
teacher exception in Weinstein because the materials were not "ex-
plicitly prepared for publication., 42 As a result, the school was the
author of the teaching materials under § 201 of the Copyright Act.43
Similarly, cases like Genzmer v. Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade
County44 and Vanderhurst v. Colorado Mountain College District
45
31 Id. at 185.
40 Id. at 186 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1958)).
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Cherry Valley, 363 F.3d at 186.
44 219 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1283 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (holding a post graduate intern working as
a physician who wrote a computer program to assist with research did so within the scope of
employment).
45 16 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1307 (D. Colo. 1998) (reasoning that a professor's outline was
connected to his employment and therefore within the scope of employment).
2009] 955
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apply the three prong common law test without mentioning the
teacher exception.
Although the teacher exception issue still arises, commenta-
tors generally agree that the exception was not preserved in the 1976
Copyright Act.46 The Supreme Court of Kansas even questioned
whether the narrow teacher exception is already accounted for in the
common law scope of employment requirement.47 It is relatively
clear from the cases decided after Reid that the teacher exception
holds little, if any, weight.
C. Ones and Zeros: Work for Hire Applied to
Computer Programming
The work for hire test laid out in Reid was based on the com-
mon law of agency. This method of evaluating work for hire has
made the test easily applicable to new forms of media and circum-
stances. However, as the analysis of each case requires a fact specific
inquiry, courts have decided a healthy number of cases involving
computer programming.
1. Applying the Employer-Employee Test to
Programmers
As in prior work for hire cases, courts dealing with computer
programmers had to determine if the creator of the work was an em-
ployee or independent contractor. In Aymes v. Bonelli, Aymes, a
46 Todd, supra note 33, at 323.
47 See Pittsburg State Univ. v. Kansas. Bd. of Regents, 122 P.3d 336, 346 (Kan. 2005)
(citing JoLynn M. Brown & James B. Wadley, Working Between the Lines of Reid: Teach-
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computer programmer, was held to be an independent contractor.
Therefore, Aymes owned the copyright to a computer program he
wrote. Similar to Reid, Aymes was asked by Island Swimming Sales,
Inc. to write a program that maintained records for the corporation-
no written agreement was made. 48 Aymes worked on the project at
Island's office and the project was monitored and tuned to fit the
company's needs.49  However, Mr. Aymes "enjoyed considerable
autonomy" when he worked, did not receive health benefits, and was
not treated by Island as an employee in its tax and payroll system. °
Applying the Reid factors to these facts, the court latched onto the
fact that Island treated Mr. Aymes like an independent contractor
through its failure to provide employee benefits and pay payroll taxes
for him.5 The court then held that Island should not be allowed to
re-categorize Mr. Aymes' status to deny him rights to his program.52
As a result, Mr. Aymes was found to be an independent contractor.
53
However, as the suit was a copyright infringement case, the court re-
manded to determine if the work could be held as a joint work.54
Similarly, in Graham v. James55 the court reasoned that de-
fendant, Larry James, was an independent contractor because "James
[wa]s a skilled computer programmer, he was paid no benefits, no
payroll taxes were withheld, and his engagement by Graham was pro-
48 Aymes, 980 F.2d at 859; see Reid, 490 U.S. at 738.
49 Aymes, 980 F.2d at 859.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 862-63.
52 Id. at 862.
" Id. at 864.
14 Aymes, 980 F.2d at 865.
55 144 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 1998).
2009] 957
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ject-by-project.,'56 Conversely, programmers were found to be em-
ployees if the Reid factors as applied to the facts of the case produced
a different result.
5 7
2. Scope of Employment of a Programmer
In addition to the employee/independent contractor analysis,
courts have also decided whether programmers were acting within
their scope of employment. Although courts have come down on dif-
ferent sides of whether computer programmers were acting within
their scope of employment, the standard has produced sound results.58
An example of how the standard has been applied to computer pro-
grammers can be seen in Avtec Systems, Inc. v. Peiffer.59 In Avtec, a
programmer who developed a program at home, within his field of
employment, was nevertheless found to be working outside the scope
of employment. 60  The court in Peiffer reasoned that Mr. Peiffer's
"orbital simulation for satellites" program was work that Mr. Peiffer
was hired to perform due to the fact that Avtec was in the business of
selling space-related computer services. 61  This satisfied the first
prong of the common law scope of employment test. However, the
56 Id. at 235.
57 See Montgomery v. Alcoa Fujikara, Ltd., No. 99-CV-73350-DT (E.D. Mich. Sept. 29,
2000), 2000 WL 1769526, at *7-8 (holding a programmer who received benefits, was paid
and taxed like a salaried employee, maintained an eight-to-five time schedule, and developed
a program on company time and equipment was an employee under the Reid test).
58 Compare Kelstall-Whitney v. Mahar, No. 89-4684, (E.D. Pa. May 23, 1990), 1990 WL
69013, at *8 (holding a computer programmer was not working within the scope of em-
ployment despite receiving some assistance and compensation), with Rouse v. Walter &
Assoc., L.L.C., 513 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1057-61 (S.D. Iowa 2007) (deciding that a scientist
who developed a program to assist with compiling research results was acting within the
scope of employment when writing the program).
'9 No. 94-2364, (4th Cir. 1995 Sept. 13, 1995), 1995 WL 541610.
60 Id. at *4-5.
61 Id. at * 1, *4.
958 [Vol. 25
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court affirmed the lower court's finding that because Mr. Peiffer
worked on the program at home and the program was not meant to
serve Avtec's interest, that the second and third prongs, respectively,
were not satisfied.62 As a result, Mr. Peiffer was not acting within the
scope of employment when he created the orbital simulation pro-
gram.63
D. Section 101(2) and the Writing Requirement
Debate
Section 101(2) of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides a sec-
ond method to fall under the work for hire doctrine. To fall under
this provision, the work must be: 1) specially commissioned for; 2)
one of the nine statutorily enumerated works; and 3) expressly agreed
to be a work for hire in a signed written instrument.64 Although
many litigated cases involve the absence of a writing between the
parties, the cases attempting to fit under § 101(2) have raised an issue
as to the meaning of the writing requirement.
Textually, § 101(2)'s meaning is straightforward: to deter-
mine the outcome of work for hire under this definition, one would
look at the facts provided and attempt to check off each of the three
elements required. However, Judge Posner, in Schiller & Schmidt,
Inc., v. Nordisco Corp., 65 read a temporal requirement into the third
element. Schmidt entailed a dispute over photographs taken by
Bertel, a photographer for Rybak, when Rybak was employed by
62 Id. at *4-5.
63 Id. at *1.
64 See supra Part III; 17 U.S.C.A. § 101(2).
65 969 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992).
20091 959
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Schiller. Rybak subsequently left the company and created a compet-
ing business, using the photographs in his catalogues.66 Schiller sued
for copyright infringement. According to Judge Posner, Bertel could
not in any way fit under the classification of an employee of Schiller;
therefore, Schiller had to rely on § 101(2) to establish copyright own-
ership. 67 Although there was no writing to support work for hire be-
tween Schiller and Bertel when the photographs were taken, Schiller
obtained Bertel's signature on an agreement after litigation had
commenced. The agreement stated that Schiller owned the copyright
to the photographs and any remaining copyrights would also be as-
signed to Schiller.68 Schiller, however, did not sign the agreement.69
Judge Posner reasoned that this agreement could not satisfy the writ-
ing requirement because "signed by them" under the statute meant
that both parties had to sign the agreement-which Schiller failed to
do.7° In addition, "the statement also came too late" because work
for hire shifts the vesting of copyright ownership to the commissioner
and attaches when the work is created. 71 Therefore, a written agree-
ment is required to precede the creation of the work for the purposes
of work for hire under § 101(2).72 Because the writing was created
after the photographs were taken, Schiller could not be the copyright
owner.
73
66 Id. at 411-12.
67 Id. at 412.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Schmidt, 969 F.2d at 412.
" Id.; 17 U.S.C.A. §201(b).




Touro Law Review, Vol. 25 [2009], No. 3, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol25/iss3/5
WORK FOR HIRE
The requirement articulated in Schmidt was rejected by the
Second Circuit three years later in Playboy Enterprises, Inc., v. Du-
mas.74 In Dumas, the court discarded the Seventh Circuit's bright
line test in favor of a different temporal requirement.75 The Second
Circuit held that as long as "the parties agree before the creation of
the work that it will be a work made for hire," the writing itself need
not "be executed before the creation of the work., 76 At issue in Du-
mas were legends on the back of checks that Playboy issued to Mr.
Nagel, a graphic artist. The legends contained the work for hire pro-
vision and were signed by both parties.77 However, neither party in
the suit "proffered any direct evidence of the intent of the parties be-
fore the creation of the works., 78 Nevertheless, the court found that
although Nagel's first check could not be evidence of an agreement
prior to the creation of the work, his subsequent endorsement of
checks could infer a "pre-creation consent to such a relationship. 79
Accordingly, the court found that the writing requirement under §
101(2) could be satisfied and the illustrations could be considered
work for hire. 80
Schmidt and Dumas show a split between the two circuits
when interpreting the temporal requirement of § 101(2). The only
court to weigh in on this split is the United States District Court in the
Southern District of Texas. In Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome
14 53 F.3d 549 (2d Cir. 1995).
" Id. at 559.
76 Id.
17 Id. at 552.
78 Id. at 560.
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Inc.,81 the court chose to follow the Second Circuit's reasoning that a
pre-creation agreement is required for a work for hire relationship to
occur.82 In addition, the agreement does not have to be memorialized
prior to the creation of the work. 83
Due to the lack of cases deciding this point, the question re-
mains open as to whether there is a bright line requirement. Yet,
what is clear is there is a temporal requirement under § 10 1(2). The
Seventh Circuit's bright line test encompasses the Second Circuit's
pre-creation intent requirement because a written agreement cannot
exist without the intent to enter into a work for hire relationship.
Thus, if there is a written document before the creation of the work,
there must be an agreement pre-creation.
In summary, the cases dealing with the writing requirement
highlight two key points. First, the intent to partake in a work for
hire relationship must precede the creation of the work. Second, both
parties must sign the writing memorializing the agreement.
84
IV. THE WEBSITE COPYRIGHT PROBLEM
A. Copyright, Work for Hire, and Website
Development
One of the latest disputes over copyright ownership involved
a criminal trial for fraud. In State v. Kirby,85 the Supreme Court of
New Mexico held that a webpage designer who created and owned
81 210 F. Supp. 2d 839 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
82 Id. at 843.
83 Id.
84 See Dumas, 53 F.3d at 364; Schmidt, 969 F.2d at 412.
85 161 P.3d 883 (N.M. 2007).
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the copyright to the webpages owned the website where the web-
pages were located.86 Richard Kirby, the defendant, approached
Loren Collett, a website developer operating under a sole proprietor-
ship, to design and develop a website. The defendant agreed to pay
Collett $1,890.00 for Collett's services.87 However, after the webde-
veloper created and incorporated the webpages into the website, the
defendant did not pay Collett and changed the password on the web-
site to lock the developer out.8 8 A written contract between the par-
ties made no explicit agreement pertaining to the website, but it did
discuss copyright ownership of the webpages. 89 The court found that
pursuant to the contract, Collett reserved the copyright of the web-
pages and that "[u]pon payment, [d]efendant would receive a kind of
license to use the website.'9°
The prosecution was required to prove that the "website [that
defendant obtained] belonged to someone other than defendant" to
convict the defendant of criminal fraud.9' Consequently, the defen-
dant argued that no reasonable jury could have found that the website
belonged to someone else because he owned the website. 92 The de-
fendant had obtained the domain name, hosting service, and pass-
words which are necessary components to any website.93
The Supreme Court of New Mexico rejected Defendant's con-
86 Id. at 884.
7 Id. at 884-85.
88 Id. at 885.
'9 Id. at 886.
90 Kirby, 161 P.3d at 886.
91 Id. at 885 (citing State v. Kirby, No. 24, 845, mem. op. (N.M. Ct. App. May 10, 2005)).
92 Id.
93 Id. at 887.
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tentions finding that a website and its webpages are interchangeable
terms for the purposes of copyright and ownership. The court
pointed to cases where copyright disputes similar to Kirby arose and
no distinctions were made between webpages and websites.94 It also
reasoned that part of the interchangeable nature of websites and web-
pages was due to the fact that a website is virtually non-existent with-
out a webpage that "gives it life. '95 Following this reasoning, the
court only had to establish who owned the copyright to the webpages
to determine ownership of the website. Because the contractual
agreement between Kirby and Collett established that copyright of
the webpages remained with the webdeveloper, the court held that a
reasonable jury could have found that Kirby committed fraud by tak-
ing a website he did not own.96
Although Kirby is a state case, the Supreme Court of New
Mexico referred to federal cases and federal statutes to make its deci-
sion. The court alluded to the work for hire doctrine in its opinion
and applied the rule of law established by Reid, § 101 and § 201 of the
Copyright Act.97 It found that Collett would have been an independ-
ent contractor, and that the written agreement between the parties was
an assignment of right, instead of a work for hire.98 Therefore, Col-
lett's webpages, and the website where the webpages were located,
94 See id. at 888-89 (citing Janes v. Watson, No. SA-05-CA-0473-XR (W.D. Tex. Aug. 2,
2006), 2006 WL 2322820; Holtzbrinck Publ'g Holdings, L.P. v. Vyne Commc'ns, Inc, No.
97 CIV. 1082 (KTD) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2000), 2000 WL 502860).
" Kirby, 161 P.3d at 887.
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were not a work for hire. 99 In addition, the court stated that because
the defendant did not argue that the website was a joint work, it did
not have to address that possibility. 00
It is unclear what the Supreme Court of New Mexico intended
with its federal work for hire analysis. Section 301 of the Copyright
Act preempts the "general scope of copyright" from being litigated in
state courts, and, therefore, a state court may not decide work for hire
issues.1 0' One possibility is that the court made a holding when it did
not have the power to do so. Another more likely possibility is that
the court applied the federal statute as a method of interpreting the
contract between the defendant and Collett. 
0 2
B. Importance of the Technical Distinction Between a
Website and a Webpage
Compared to other forms of media, the Internet, websites, and
webpages are still considered a new development. This is evidenced
in Kirby and other cases where courts have outlined a basic explana-
tion of the Internet and the website/webpage relationship.'0 3 The out-
come of Kirby seems fair-the defendant's conduct of refusing to pay
someone and then blocking him from taking back the work was egre-
99 Id.
100 Kirby, 161 P.3d at 886 n.1.
"' 17 U.S.C.A. § 301(a) (West 2005).
102 Kirby was decided in a state court that does not have the power to expand or reduce
copyrights. However, state courts can decide contracts dealing with copyrights in certain
instances, like assignments of copyrights. It is important to understand the decision was
most likely made on the basis of contract theory and not the federal work for hire statute.
However, the Kirby Court used federal principals to help interpret the terms of the contract.
For a more extensive discussion of copyright preemption and § 301, see Trotter Hardy, Con-
tracts, Copyright and Preemption in a Digital World, 1 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2 (1995).
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gious. However, the court goes too far in holding that a copyright
holder of webpages placed on a website is the owner of the website
itself.
In its technical explanation, the Supreme Court of New Mex-
ico delineated the difference between a webpage and website. Citing
Sublett v. Wallin, 10 4 the court explained that a "website consists of
any number of webpages" and therefore, a "webpage is an integral
part of a website."'' 0 5 By adopting this definition, the court places
webpages as a subset of a website. Although it is possible that one
who owns a subset owns the whole, automatically attributing owner-
ship of an entire set to the owner of a subset is illogical.
After distinguishing a webpage from a website, the court
turned around and cited precedent in which other courts discussed
websites and webpages as one entity.106 It then adopted this oversim-
plified view and affirmed the defendant's conviction on the ground
that the webdeveloper owned the website. °7 Instead of coming to
this conclusion, the court could have used a different line of reason-
ing to find that the defendant committed fraud. After all, the defen-
dant was effectively preventing the webdeveloper from reclaiming or
accessing the webpages that he owned.
The number of people who use the Internet and computer
technology are growing at a rapid pace.108 As this shift occurs, it will
'04 94 P.3d 845 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004).
105 Kirby, 161 P.3d at 885 (citing Sublett, 94 P.3d 845).
106 Id. at 887-88 (citing Janes, 2006 WL 2322820; Holtzbrinck, 2000 WL 502860).
107 Id. at 889.
108 Growth of users on the Internet has risen 265.6% from 2000 to 2007. Internet World
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be increasingly difficult to find people without a minimal, low-level
understanding of the Internet and the different roles played by a web-
site or a webpage. By grouping website and webpage as one, the
court ignores the fact that on a technical level, the two are distinct,
and that there should be a legal separation with regard to the rights
involved.
C. Interdependency of Webpages, Webaddress, and
Service Providers
The Kirby Court justifies its holding that a webpage owner is
also the owner of the website by explaining that a webpage is the
substance that gives a website "life."1 9 Although it is true that a
website without webpages is of little to no value, if any of the other
necessary components of a website were missing, it would also ren-
der a website valueless.11° Minimizing the value of a domain name,
the court states that "it is nothing more than an address."' 11 However,
without an address, a website will be unable to provide its content
with ease on the World Wide Web. Users who wish to access a web-
site without a domain name would have to obtain the direct address
from the service provider, which is usually a series of forgettable
numbers. 1 2 Without an address, one of the main purposes of a web-
site--convenience-is greatly burdened. Furthermore, the value in a
domain name is significant, as evidenced by the protection given by
109 Kirby, 161 P.3d at 887.
110 Id.
111 Id. (citing STEVEN D. IMPARL, INTERNET LAW: THE COMPLETE GUIDE Part.II.4.1
(2006)).
112 See SIGNPOSTS IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 6, at 19.
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the federal government to domain names through the "Anticyber-
squatting" statute.' 
13
Similarly, without a commercial service provider, a website's
webpages would have to be stored and run from a personal machine.
This would tax the bandwidth of most websites causing a dramatic
loss of speed-and possibly crashes under a high load.'1 4 An unreli-
able and slow website would be, as the Kirby Court described, of "lit-
tle use to any business enterprise.' '" 5 It is not being argued that the
owner of the domain name or service provider owns a website.
These components, like webpages, are subsets of a website that rely
on each other to create a functional website.1 6 As a result, basing
ownership of a website on ownership of any one of these components
is illogical.
D. Websites with User Controlled Webpages
By simplifying websites and webpages as one, the Kirby deci-
sion also established a dangerous precedent that could give rise to il-
logical results. The success of websites as sources of cutting edge in-
formation stems partly from the level of interactivity and freedom
given to users on the Internet. Many websites are set up not to di-
rectly disperse information, but instead to spur discussion."17 This
113 See Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125 (d) (West 1998
& Supp. 2007) (preventing a person to register and hold highly sought after domain names
for the sole purpose of selling them).
H'4 See, e.g., Darren Dahl, Traffic's Up; Website's Down, INC.COM, Mar. 2008,
http://www.inc.com/magazine/20080301/traffics-up-websites-down.html (last visited Mar.
23, 2008).
115 Kirby, 161 P.3d at 887.
116 See IGNACIMUTHU, supra note 5, at 17.
117 For example, many law school professors use "TWEN," a Westlaw teaching tool that
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method allows users to read input from other users regarding a topic.
To follow this trend of horizontal information sharing, there are nu-
merous websites on the Internet that relinquish control of their indi-
vidual webpages to users or visitors of the website. For example,
websites like wikipedia.com and other "wikis" allow users to edit
parts of the webpages to contribute information." 8  Similarly,
myspace.com allows users to upload entire blocks of Cascading Style
Sheet ("CSS")" 9 code to create their personal webpages within the
site. 20 And finally, websites like geocities.com provide free hosting
where users are given passwords and server space to upload their
own webpages in HTML form.
1 2'
Although most of these websites are protected by terms of use
agreements, if a site happens to lack a user agreement or a court finds
an agreement unenforceable, it is plausible after Kirby that a user or
group of users who own the copyright to the individual webpages
will be able to take ownership of a website. This would be an unac-
ceptable result as it would threaten companies that allow for more
widespread personalized user interaction that is unique to the way the
Internet compiles and distributes information.
V. CAN WEBSITES BE WORKS FOR HIRE?
Kirby did not focus much on the application of work for hire
provides an online forum for outside class discussions. See The West Education Network,
http://lawschool.westlaw.com/twen (last visited Mar. 23, 2009).
118 See Wikipedia, http://www.wikipedia.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2009).
119 KEITH HARMAN & ALEX KOOHANG, LEARNING OBJECTS: STANDARDS, METADATA,
REPOSITORIES, & LCMS 119 (2007).
120 See MySpace, http://www.myspace.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2009).
121 See Yahoo! Geocities, http://geocities.yahoo.com (last visited Sept. 22, 2008); see also
HARMAN & KOOHANG, supra note 119, at 118.
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within its analysis. However, the case highlights the importance of
understanding the work for hire doctrine and applying the doctrine in
appropriate situations. The Kirby case found that Collett, the web
developer, was an independent contractor under the Reid test. 22 Al-
though the court did not specifically analyze the factors involved, the
fact that Collett ran a sole proprietorship, did not retain any benefits
from Kirby, and was to be compensated in a lump sum at the comple-
tion of work made it virtually indisputable that Collett was an inde-
pendent contractor.'23 Categorized as an independent contractor, Col-
lett owned the copyright to the webpages under § 201(a) of the
Copyright Act. On the other hand, if the facts were different and
Collett was found to be an employee working within the scope of
employment, the websites he created would fall under work for
hire. 24
Not as certain is whether a website can fall under § 101(2).
The extent of the Kirby Court's analysis under § 10 1(2) was outlining
the three requirements and stating that, "these elements are lack-
ing."'125 Although the court was probably motivated by the fact that
the only written agreement between the parties was a contract of as-
signment, one can only guess which element, or if all of the elements,
were lacking. 1
26
In the context of a hypothetical web development situation,
122 Kirby, 161 P.3dat887n.l.
123 See id. at 884-85.
124 See supra Part W.A.
125 Id. at 887 n.1 (stating that in order for § 101(2) to apply, "the parties must expressly
agree in a signed written instrument that the work will be work for hire and the work must be
commissioned for one of nine uses listed in the Copyright Act").
126 See id. at 886.
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element one requiring that the work be specially contracted for would
usually not be an issue. This is because the relationship between par-
ties in a web development context usually requires a client to ap-
proach a web developer who is then informed as to the scope of the
website, and any features that the client would like implemented on
the website. Even if the web developer is given artistic freedom, the
developer would still have to be given basic facts like the type of
website (business or personal), the information to be placed on the
website, and a webaddress (depending on whether the client has pur-
chased a domain name), before the developer can begin work on a
website. Similarly, element three would not bar a website from being
a work for hire as it is up to the parties to produce a written agree-
ment.127 In addition, the temporal requirement necessitating the par-
ties to agree before the creation of the work should be easily satisfied
following the same reasoning as element one.
128
On the other hand, element two requires that the work be one
of the nine specifically enumerated works listed in the statute.129
Courts have not weighed in on whether a website can fall under one
of the nine enumerated works in § 101(2). Because the creation of
websites can differ drastically from case to case, each website would
have to be analyzed individually to determine if it could fall within
the enumerated works. A website could fit within the realm of a
127 17 U.S.C.A. § 101(2).
128 See supra Part IV.D. It is up to the parties to have a pre-creation agreement. The work
that is involved is irrelevant for the temporal requirement.
29 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 10 1(2) (the nine enumerated works are "contribution to a collective
work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supple-
mentary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a
test, or as an atlas").
2009]
29
Beh: WORK FOR HIRE
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2009
TOURO LA WREVIEW
compilation if the website was created as a listing of other sites ad-
dressing a topic, or if a website was a hub for a network for spoke
sites."3 Conversely, if a web developer was employed to create a
website that merely focuses on distributing information, it will
probably not fit within one of the enumerated works.
VI. PRECAUTIONS TO TAKE UNDER THE WORK FOR HIRE
DOCTRINE
Work for hire's flexible test creates difficulty in predicting
whether the doctrine can be applied to the field of web development.
However, having the understanding that current copyright laws are
not yet fully adapted to this new technology highlights a few precau-
tions that each party can take before entering into a business deal in-
volving the creation of websites.
Why Collett in the Kirby case ended up developing the web-
pages directly on the defendant's system is somewhat of a mystery.13'
Within the industry it is commonplace for developers to first program
the pages locally and host the webpage from their machine so that a
client can view, test, and request changes be made to the webpage.1
32
After the pages are approved, the webdeveloper will then publish the
website onto the client's service provider which has a domain name
attached to it. 133 Developing a website or webpage in this manner al-
130 See, e.g., Janes, 2006 WL 2322820, at *12 (dismissing a work for hire claim by ac-
knowledging that a website, where multiple persons were involved in creating components
of the site, could be a compilation).
"'1 See Kirby, 161 P.3d at 885.
132 See, e.g., Attig v. DRG, Inc., No. Civ.A.04-CV-3740 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2005), 2005
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lows developers to have complete control over their own work until
everything has been finalized. Although it does not protect a devel-
oper from a client that intends from the outset to swindle the pro-
grammer, it alleviates the situation where payment is withheld due to
a client's belief that the work is unsatisfactory. This method does not
give control to the client until the last moment of the business trans-
action.
It is easy for website managers to believe that they own a
website when they have the power to control what is accessible
through the domain name or the service provider. However, as seen
in Kirby and the cases that it cites, courts in some instances have
simplified the technological difference between a website and a web-
page. 34 As a result, a prudent website manager would not only dis-
cuss copyright ownership of the webpages that a developer creates,
but also specifically address the ownership of the website as a whole
in any contractual agreement. In addition, a website manager must
be careful about locking a developer out by changing passwords.
What seems to be a mere disrespectful action could result in dire cir-
cumstances, as witnessed in Kirby where the defendant was convicted
of a criminal fraud.'
35
For an attorney drafting contracts to fit under § 101(2), a few
issues are not apparent from a textual reading of the statute. First, the
written agreement must describe with specificity the exact work be-
ing commissioned. 36 In the event that one person is being used for a
114 Kirby, 161 P.3d at 888-89.
... Id. at 884.
136 17 U.S.C.A. § 101(2).
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series of works, separate contracts or clauses specifying each piece of
work should be drafted. In the web development context, an attorney
should make sure that copyrights with regard to the webpages and the
website are specifically discussed to avoid future confusion or possi-
ble litigation. Secondly, the agreement to engage in a work for hire
relationship must occur before the creation of the work.'37 Although
there is a split in the Circuits as to whether an agreement has to be
memorialized before the work begins, 138 it would be advisable to fol-
low the stricter rule from the Seventh Circuit and execute the written
agreement prior to the creation of the work. This will minimize the
risk of litigation regardless of which jurisdiction a client might be in.
Until the law pertaining to this issue is more settled, there is no pre-
dictability. Employing this method would also protect a client from
unnecessary disputes with regard to the temporal requirement as the
documentation would serve as solid evidence of a pre-creation
agreement if a dispute goes to trial.
Nonetheless, the above method only works if an attorney is
given the opportunity to advise a client prior to the creation of the
work. Many situations involve works which have already begun, but
not yet completed. For example, a company seeking to develop
products based on proposals will usually encounter a situation where
a prototype or some work has already been completed. To ensure
that a client who is seeking to use the work for hire doctrine in this
type of situation is protected, it would be prudent to draft a contract
clause dealing with copyright in two steps. First, the creator should
137 See Dumas, 53 F.3d at 559.
138 See supra Part III.D.
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assign any and all current copyright to the commissioner of the work;
and, second, a separate clause, preferably using the phrase "work for
hire," should be included to cover all future work done by the creator.
This type of drafting would comply with the temporal requirement of
work for hire while ensuring that the commissioner has the copyright.
VII. THE NEXT BIG CASE: CAN WEBSITES BE A JOINT WORK?
Because cases dealing with copyright and work for hire in the
field of computer programming and website development are scarce,
the question of whether a website can constitute a joint work has not
yet been considered. In addition, the joint work standard depends on
the circumstances surrounding the work. Some cases declined to
evaluate the joint work standard because the parties never argued the
issue, while others remanded the issue back to lower courts. 
139
A. The Joint Work Standard
Similar to work for hire, the joint work standard is established
in §§ 201(a) and 101 of the Copyright Act of 1976. Section 201(a)
states that "authors of a joint work are coowners of copyright in the
work," while § 101 defines joint work to be "a work prepared by two
or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged
into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole." 140 The
joint work standard is best illustrated in Weissmann v. Freeman.
141
Weissmann involved an assistant to a researcher who co-authored a
139 See Kirby, 161 P.3d at 887 n.1;see also Janes, 2006 WL 2322820 at * 10; Aymes, 980
F.2d at 865.
140 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 201(a).
14' 868 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1989).
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few articles. The assistant produced a derivative work of one of the
articles which the researcher used as his own.'42 First, the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the district court was mis-
taken in finding that when a derivative work is created, the authorship
of the derivative work is automatically the same as the authorship of
the original. 4 3 Instead, each author must have intended to contribute
an inseparable part to the whole work and in fact, contributed to the
work.14 4 Because the court found that the researcher never had the
intention to be a co-author of his assistant's derivative work, it re-
versed the lower court and held that the researcher infringed upon his
assistant's copyright interests. 45 The court noted that the intent re-
quirement should not be mistaken to mean that the parties must know
who the other contributors will be at the time a contribution is cre-
ated. 146 As long as a contributor knows his or her work is going to
produce a final joint work, the intent requirement is satisfied.1
47
The joint work standard was further explained in Erickson v.
Trinity Theatre, Inc. 48 The Seventh Circuit held that, in addition to
the intent to create an inseparable work, each alleged author's contri-
bution must be independently copyrightable. 49 The court scrutinized
two different tests for joint works, the Nimmer-test and the Gold-
142 Id. at 1315.
141 Id. at 1317.
'44 Id. at 1318.
145 Id. at 1327.
146 Weissmann, 868 F.2d at 1319 (citing Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel
Music Co., 140 F.2d 266, 267 (2d Cir. 1944) (holding a lyrics writer knew his work would
be part of a joint work even though he did not know who would sing or produce the song)).
147 Weissmann, 868 F.2d at 1319 (citing Marks, 140 F.2d at 267).
141 13 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 1994).
149 Id. at 1070-71.
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stein-test. 15 Under the Nimmer-test, achieving joint author status re-
quires only that the author make "more than a de minimis contribu-
tion." 151 In contrast, the Goldstein-test requires that each contribution
to the whole be independently copyrightable.
15 2
In adopting the Goldstein-test, the court reasoned that Gold-
stein's "copyrightability test str[uck] an appropriate balance in the
domains of both copyright and contract law" because it allows au-
thors to receive suggestions without risking authorship rights. 153 In
addition, contributors who deemed their suggestions to be useful, but
not copyrightable, could protect themselves by contract. 154 Applying
the facts under the Goldstein-test, even though the defendant could
establish that there was intent to be joint authors for one of the plays
that the plaintiff wrote, the suggestions were not copyrightable. 55 As
a result, the preliminary injunction was affirmed because the defen-
dant could not be a joint author, raising the likelihood that plaintiff
would succeed on her infringement claim. 1
56
However, a decision by the same circuit ten years later in
Gaiman v. McFarlane,'57 questioned if the Goldstein-test should be
applied in all cases. In McFarlane, the Seventh Circuit held that in
cases where the "nature of the particular creative process" makes it so
each person's contribution, standing alone, is not copyrightable, but
150 Id. at 1069.
151 Id. at 1069-70.
152 Id. at 1070-71.
'53 Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1071 (citing Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507 (2d Cir.
1991)).
154 Id.
' Id. at 1066.
156 Id. at 1073.
"' 360 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2004).
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the end product is copyrightable, each contributor can be considered
an author of a joint work.5 8 McFarlane dealt with the comic book
industry where the work is naturally divided into writing, penciling,
inking, and coloring. Judge Posner envisioned the situation where
each individual contribution to the comic book, would not rise to the
level of copyrightability, but the final work would be copyright-
able. 59 Reasoning that it would be paradoxical to find that no one
owned the copyright to a copyrightable piece of work, the court held
that in these situations, each contributor would be a joint author if
they intended at the outset to create the joint work. 60 Judge Posner
then considered the Nimmer-test, which was rejected in Erickson,
and applied the test to McFarlane.16' Because Mr. Gaiman was spe-
cifically hired as a writer to help develop characters in the Spawn
comic series, Judge Posner found that the parties set out to create a
joint work. In addition, the court found that Mr. Gaiman's contribu-
tions to certain comic book characters were not mere suggestions or
ideas, even though they would not have been copyrightable standing
alone. 1
62
Application of the Nimmer-test in the McFarlane case poses
the question of whether Erickson is still good law in the Seventh Cir-
cuit. The McFarlane decision refused to apply the Goldstein-test, but
also did not specifically overrule Erickson. Furthermore, the opinion
makes note that the Goldstein-test generally produces correct results,
158 Id. at 658-59.
'5 Id. at 659.
160 Id. at 658-59.
161 Id. at 659.
162 McFarlane, 360 F.3d at 661.
978 [Vol. 25
36
Touro Law Review, Vol. 25 [2009], No. 3, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol25/iss3/5
WORK FOR HIRE
but does not account for the case where every partial contribution
would not be copyrightable, while the finished product would be.'
63
It is possible that the cases are consistent with each other. If the
McFarlane decision is read narrowly, the Goldstein-test would still
be the standard to determine authors in a joint work situation unless
the nature of the work makes it so that each contribution would not
rise to the level of copyrightability.
164
B. Can Websites Fall Under the Joint Work
Standard?
For a website to be considered a joint work between a com-
missioner and a web developer, the parties and website will have to
meet the elements articulated by §§ 101 and 102 of the Copyright Act
and case law. Specifically, the creators of a website must have the
intent to create a piece of inseparable work together. In addition,
depending on which test a jurisdiction applies, each contribution must
either be individually copyrightable or exceed the threshold of mere
suggestion. Kirby never decided whether the website was a joint
work. 165 Therefore, this section will use the relevant facts in Kirby to
evaluate if a typical website development relationship will produce a
website with joint authors.1
66
1. Intent to Create a Joint Work
For a joint work to exist, the authors involved must have the
163 Id. at 658-59.
164 See Brown v. Flowers, 196 F. App'x 178, 188 n.5 (4th Cir. 2006) (questioning if
McFarlane should be limited to "mixed media" circumstances).
165 Kirby, 161 P.3d at 887 n.1.
166 See supra Part III.D.
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intent to create a joint work. 167 In Kirby, the defendant purchased the
domain name and obtained a service provider. The defendant then
approached a webpage designer to create the pages that would be as-
sociated with the domain name and host. In this situation, it is rea-
sonable to infer that the parties had the intent to jointly create a web-
site. The defendant would have known that without the content
providing webpages, his website would not exist. Similarly, the de-
signer, with the advantage of technical knowledge, would know that
his webpages would not be found on the Internet without a domain
name or host. Therefore, the defendant and the webdeveloper in
Kirby would have had the intent to create a website together.
Conversely, another typical website development relationship
is where the commissioner asks the web developer not only to design
the webpages, but also to obtain all the other necessary components
for a website. Intent to create a joint work is less evident in this in-
stance because the webdeveloper would be in control of all the com-
ponents of a website. The relationship established in this scenario is
more likely to be interpreted as intent to purchase or license a web-
site, instead of the intent to create a joint work.
2. Work Must be Inseparable
The second element of joint work is that each contribution
must be inseparable from the whole. 68 Webpages and a domain
name are easily interchangeable on a technological level because
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webpages can be placed under any domain name and vice versa. 169
But, when viewed within the context of a website, it can be argued
they cannot be separated. Webpages are usually tailored to fit a spe-
cific domain name because having a webpage with an arbitrary or
misleading domain name is not functional. 70 The consistency of a
domain name and its webpages serve the primary functions of a web-
site by making the site memorable and searchable. Thus, a website's
domain name, and the webpages created for that particular website,
should be considered inseparable contributions to the whole.
3. Jumping Through the Hoops of Goldstein
and Nimmer
The final requirement for a joint work depends on which test
a court chooses to follow. Under the jurisdictions following the
Goldstein-test, each individual contribution would have to be copy-
rightable. Courts have found that webpages are works that are gener-
ally afforded copyright protection.1 71 On the other hand, domain
names are considered uncopyrightable "short phrases" under 37
C.F.R. Section 202.1(a). 172 Even if a commissioner were to argue
that he gave the idea and direction for the website, a court applying
the Goldstein-test would probably find that the suggestions are not
protected by copyright. 173 Therefore, under the Goldstein-test, the
169 See IGNACIMUTHU, supra note 5, at 17.
170 See SIGNPOSTS IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 6, at 1-2.
171 See, e.g., Kirby, 161 P.3d 833; Kantemirov v. Goldine, No. C05-01362 HRL (N.D.
Cal. June 29, 2005), 2005 WL 1593533.
172 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2007); see also Fryer v. Brown, No. C04-5481 FDB (W.D.
Wash. July 15, 2005), 2005 WL 1677940, at * 4 (interpreting C.F.R. § 202.1 and holding a
domain name not copyrightable).
173 Under Erickson, suggestions and direction is not enough to rise to the level of copy-
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defendant in Kirby would not have been considered a joint author of
the website because he only contributed suggestions and a domain
name.
Website development is analogous to the comic book indus-
try. In the same way a character-writer and an inker are important to
a comic book, a domain name and host are highly valued contribu-
tions to a website. Yet these components are not independently copy-
rightable. In spite of this, under the Nimmer-test, a court would
probably find each contribution to be above the threshold, and allow
a commissioner to be a joint author. Applying the Nimmer-test, the
court in McFarlane outlined a hypothetical involving two professors
who intend to create a joint work:
Here is a typical case from academe. One professor
has brilliant ideas but can't write; another is an excel-
lent writer, but his ideas are commonplace. So they
collaborate on an academic article, one contributing
the ideas, which are not copyrightable, and the other
the prose envelope, and . . . they sign as coauthors.
Their intent to be joint owners of the copyright in the
article would be plain, and that should be enough to
constitute them joint authors .... 174
Website development can involve a situation very similar to
that expressed by Judge Posner, where one person has the vision and
artistic planning of a website, while the other merely has the technical
prowess to write code and carry out that vision. The parties in this
instance would work hand-in-hand until the website is completed.
rightability. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
114 McFarlane, 360 F.3d at 659.
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This situation would be one of those paradoxical instances described
by Judge Posner, where the Nimmer-test should be applied. If the
Nimmer-test is applied to this hypothetical, the planning and vision
should be more than a de minima contribution, making it probable
that the website would be considered a joint work.'75
4. Websites Should be Considered Joint Work
As discussed above, websites should easily satisfy the first
and second element of joint work. The third element depends on
whether a court decides to apply the Nimmer or the Goldstein stan-
dard. 176 Judge Posner delivered a strong argument for applying the
Nimmer-test in McFarlane because of the paradoxical nature of cer-
tain industries. Although it is unclear, it seems that Judge Posner is
advocating use of the Nimmer-test only in specific situations when
the Goldstein-test is unsuitable. 7 7 If that is the case, the Nimmer-test
for the third element should be used for the web development indus-
try. Web development suffers from the same problems that the comic
book industry encountered in McFarlane. If a commissioner pours
energy into visualizing a website and does the "ground work" of ob-
taining a domain name and a service provider, they have contributed
necessary components to a website. However, these necessary por-
tions of a website are not copyrightable. Applying the Goldstein-test
strictly would leave the commissioner's valuable contribution unpro-
tected. Unlike the Goldstein-test, the Nimmer-test would produce a
175 See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
176 See supra Part VII.B.1-3.
177 McFarlane, 360 F.3d at 659 (stating that in the majority of instances, the Goldstein-test
yields sound results, but noting the test is flawed in other situations).
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more equitable result in the context of website development.
VIII. CONCLUSION
When dealing with new forms of media, technical definitions
in the trade should correlate to the legal world. A webpage and a
website are two technically distinct entities, and should be treated as
such. Although a website consists mainly of webpages, other com-
ponents like a domain name and server space are necessary pieces
that comprise a website. Each component plays an important part in
the functionality of a website and sometimes has significant monetary
value.178 The Kirby Court decided to group a website and its corre-
sponding webpages because it deemed webpages to be the most im-
portant aspect of a website. 179 This simplification produced a sound
result in Kirby. However, there are a host of problems involved with
this line of reasoning.
The industry does not use the term webpage and website in-
terchangeably.180 A webpage is considered a subset of a website, and
the legal world should draw this distinction. It is illogical to assume
that the owner of a subset also owns the entire parent set, especially
when the other components in the parent set have significant value.
Furthermore, the Internet thrives on the wealth of information com-
piled through many different sources. This has evolved into a world
where individual users can make significant contributions to a web-
site through forums, personalized webpages, and other interactive
178 See SIGNPOSTS IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 6, at 1-2.
179 Kirby, 160 P.3d at 887.
..o See IGNACIMUTHU, supra note 5, at 17.
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methods of information sharing. If owners of webpages also own the
website, it is plausible that websites which allow heavy user interac-
tion with unenforceable or invalid terms of use agreements, could
eventually be taken over by its users. This is a result that is unrea-
sonable and a hindrance to the unique way the Internet functions.
Apart from the technical distinctions of a webpage and a web-
site, courts are also faced with the application of the work for hire
doctrine in the area of web development. There are two ways of fal-
ling under the work for hire doctrine of § 201 (b). The first is through
the work for hire standard articulated in Reid.18 1 The employer-
employee test is a flexible twelve factor test that requires a fact spe-
cific inquiry based on whether an employer-employee relationship
exists. Although a multi-factored test is difficult to apply, the stan-
dard is malleable enough to fit the various forms of media in today's
world, and any new types of media that might come in the future.
The Reid work for hire doctrine can easily be molded to fit the web
development industry, and the outcomes depend on the facts. Web
developers could work as in-house information technology personnel,
which would probably place them under the employee category, or,
they could be independent contractors commissioned to produce a
single website, where the commissioner has no control over the de-
velopers.
The second method requires three elements: (1) the work
must be specifically commissioned; (2) there must be a writing, and;
18 See supra note 15.
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(3) the work has to fall under one of the nine enumerated works. 82
The first two requirements do not act as obstacles for web develop-
ment work to be considered work for hire. However, falling into one
of the nine enumerated works is more difficult. Determination of
what type of work a website is, relies mainly on the content provided
by the webpages. Because webpages can consist of content that
reaches the bounds of imagination, it would be possible for a web-
page to fall under "a contribution to a collective work.., other audio
visual work [or] . . . a compilation."
' 183
Other than work for hire, the joint work doctrine seems like a
better fit for the web development industry. A website could be con-
sidered a joint work under the doctrine because it would be simple to
satisfy the intent and inseparable requirements. 184 In addition, even
though the Goldstein-test would bar a website from being a joint
work, the decision in McFarlane to apply the Nimmer-test in select
situations should also apply to the web development industry.
The nature of web development produces situations where a
contributor provides necessary components to a website, like a do-
main name or a host. However, those components by themselves do
not rise to the level of copyrightability. The Nimmer-test in a web
development situation will give protection to the contributor of a
concept and domain name of a website.
Although the work for hire and joint works doctrines require
case-by-case analysis, understanding the nuances of the doctrines is
182 See 17 U.S.C.A. § 101(2).
183 Id.
184 See supra Part VII.B. 1-2.
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invaluable to any attorney, businessperson, or author who will en-
counter copyright issues. Working carefully with the Copyright Act,
one should be able to minimize the risk of litigation or future disputes
about copyright.
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